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Abstract 
This paper advocates for making epistemic interests a central object of philosophical 
analysis in epistemology and philosophy of science. It is argued that the importance of 
epistemic interests derives from their fundamental importance for the notion of objectivity. 
Epistemic interests are defined as individuated by a set of objectives, each of which 
represents a dimension of the search for truth. Among these dimensions, specificity, 
sensitivity, and productivity (the rate at which results are delivered per unit of time) are 
discussed in detail. It is argued that the relevance of productivity is often overlooked in 
debates about the ends and means of science. A definition of the objectivity of inquiry is 
proposed that takes the notion of epistemic interest as its starting point. 
1. Introduction 
My aim in this paper is to show that epistemology and philosophy of science ought to 
reinstate epistemic interests, which are understood and defined here in a specific sense that 
I shall seek to delineate, as a central subject of philosophical analysis. I maintain that the 
importance of the concept of epistemic interest is due to its intimate connection to a notion 
that was once crucial for epistemology, but that has come under criticism and has since 
been in crisis—the concept of objectivity. Understanding epistemic interests, I shall argue, 
will enable us to identify an important sense of objectivity that can provide an acceptable 
and much needed normative ideal and quality criterion for inquiry. 
Objectivity—in any of the various senses in which the term has historically been 
used—is often an important concern in inquiry of whatever kind. In what follows, I will 
focus on scientific inquiry since it has traditionally stood as a model of objectivity and can 
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still provide particularly powerful examples which show that a perceived lack of objectivity 
continues to be an appropriate cause of alarm.  
2. Objectivity in crisis 
Objectivity is notoriously difficult to pin down as a concept. Attempts to capture it in 
philosophical analysis bring to light a dazzling variety of notions of objectivity, without 
revealing a clear ‘brand essence’ (Douglas, 2004; Megill, 1994). 
On the one hand, there is an influential notion that reduces objectivity to so-called 
mind-independent truth. While common parlance, “mind-independent truth” is a slightly 
misleading expression, because what is at issue is not a certain kind of truth but rather the 
characteristic of being made true (or false) by a certain kind of fact. It may be true, for 
example, that the radiator seems hot to me, but this truth is not objective insofar as facts 
concerning the observer’s state of mind figure among the relevant truth conditions. In 
contrast, the proposition that this radiator has a surface temperature of more than 60° 
centigrade can be construed as one whose truth conditions reside only in mind-independent 
facts. It is this sense of objectivity that underlies one of the central questions of modern 
Western philosophy, namely the question of how objective knowledge is possible in the 
first place. As such, this notion makes objectivity primarily a characteristic of propositions. 
Insofar as episodes of inquiry can be more or less conducive to knowledge of the relevant 
kind of propositions, they, too, can be qualified as more or less objective, but only in a 
derivative sense. Thus, the focus of this notion of objectivity is not on episodes of inquiry, 
but on kinds of propositions. Likewise, the only way in which objectivity in this sense is 
linked to scientific knowledge in particular is via the tenuous claim that (some) scientific 
methods are particularly apt for giving us access to mind-independent facts. 
Objectivity is also associated with specific kinds of attempts to systematically weed 
out idiosyncratic influences on our system of knowledge. As a result, there is a notion of 
objectivity that can be described as a kind of invariance—in particular, invariance over 
change of perspective, but also invariance over change of system of reference and similar 
transformations.1 Standardized modes of representation such as ground plans or cross 
sections of buildings and other technical artifacts, for example, embody the desire to 
emphasize objective information in this sense. Likewise, attempts to make maps that are 
less eurocentric strive for a faithful representation of ratios of areas or ratios of distances, 
and thus of magnitudes that, in contrast to proximity or preferred orientation, are invariant 
 
1 In his last book, Robert Nozick (2001) has elaborated a conception of objectivity for which this 
understanding is fundamental. 
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under different perspectives. Progress in methodology cannot eliminate the need for 
perspective or the necessity of a system of reference altogether, but it can serve to focus 
attention on those magnitudes and kinds of information that are invariant under change of 
perspective. 
Relatedly, there is a sense of objectivity that signifies procedures that strive to 
minimize the risk of human error. Methods that serve to bypass or short circuit the human 
element in research are thus considered particularly objective (Daston & Galison, 2007, 
Chapter 3). Photography, for example, was soon after its invention hailed as a particularly 
objective method of producing scientific images.  
Last but not least, another influential conception of objectivity is related to one 
specific kind of distortion that human agents are thought to bring into the process of 
inquiry—their values and interests. Often, objectivity used to be understood as value 
freedom. 
It is not easy to make out a common core in this variety of uses. Synthesizing the 
constraints stipulated by each of them in an additive way to create a maximal notion of 
objectivity would lead us to some such conception as ‘whatever it is that is solely und 
uniquely determined by the object, without any influence of the subject’. Such a maximal 
conception does not seem to have much use except a negative one, to mark objectivity as 
something unattainable and illusionary—at least as far as science and human knowledge are 
concerned. But even weaker notions of objectivity have come under heavy criticism at least 
since post-war times. 
An early criticism was a line of thought developed within critical theory, according to 
which in any kind of inquiry, human interests are required to give it purpose and direction. 
Bringing interests back into the epistemological picture was then thought to reveal that the 
most that traditional notions of objectivity could achieve was to define just one kind of 
epistemic interest among many that can legitimately be pursued. 
Objectivity in the sense of a correct, subject-independent representation of fact had 
already come under criticism as a mere illusion in Max Horkheimer’s (1937/1999) 
portrayal of what he called “traditional theory”. This criticism was further sharpened in the 
1960s, in the context of the positivism dispute. The critical theorists held that traditional 
epistemologists had, in their attempts to answer the question about the possibility of 
objective knowledge, neglected the ubiquity and permeating power of interests (Habermas 
1968/1971). They had relied on a strict separation of theoretical from practical rationality, 
and thereby of the realm of the cognitive from the realm of human interests. However, this 
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perspective ignores the extent to which the very framework for every cognitive endeavor is 
constituted by the full phenomenon of human development (“Bildung”). Analyzing the 
“transcendental frame” in each case reveals the interests underlying it. Both Marx and the 
positivists, so the critical theorists believe, have only perpetuated these traditional mistakes 
by postulating a unity of science and thereby denying the decisive differences in epistemic 
interests underlying different kinds of inquiry. The early Habermas in particular argued that 
by identifying, distinguishing, and revealing the epistemic interests at work, critical theory 
could destroy the “objectivist appearance”, or “objectivist illusion” of science (1968/1971, 
p. 308). 
If this criticism was ever seriously considered in mainstream philosophy of science, it 
was soon overshadowed by intellectual developments that began to unfold only a little later 
in the course of the onslaught of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and other post-
positivistic philosophers of science against the received view. Both were widely understood 
to have shown that experiment and observation could not be seen as neutral arbiters of truth 
in science and that this realization undermined the idea that science is based on objective 
fact. From the thesis that there is no paradigm-independent standpoint from which to judge 
the relative merits of competing hypotheses many popularizers of these new ideas inferred 
that values and interests had to play a role in theory choice. 
This theoretical development has found its continuation in the more recent erosion of 
the value-free ideal. While Kuhn (1977) himself emphasized the relevance of a certain, 
limited set of values that were characteristic for science, later critics claimed that there was 
no principled distinction possible between epistemic and non-epistemic, or cognitive and 
non-cognitive values (Longino, 1990, 2002). Together with a second line of criticism that 
revived arguments from the 1950s and 1960s about inductive risks and the indispensability 
of value input for setting standards of evidence (Douglas, 2000, 2009), this resulted in a 
sweeping attack on value-freedom as an epistemic ideal. Today, the value-free ideal may be 
the one element from the range of traditional notions of objectivity that is most thoroughly 
dead, occasional desperate attempts at resuscitation notwithstanding. 
Especially the problem that it seems impossible to manage inductive risks and set 
standards of evidence without recourse to non-epistemic values, as had been pointed out by 
Richard Rudner (1953) and forcefully elaborated by Heather Douglas, makes value 
freedom an ideal that seems very difficult to defend. An ideal of objectivity that appeals to 
value freedom could not possibly exclude extra-scientific values from all scientific 
practices, as deciding which questions to pursue as well as which results to apply to 
practical matters are obviously activities in which moral or political values may 
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legitimately be considered. The ideal would have to exclude such value-influences only 
from the kind of practices that are concerned with the testing and ultimately the acceptance 
or rejection of theories and hypotheses. The following would be a first approximation to 
such an ideal: ‘In objective research, moral, political, and other non-epistemic values must 
not exert any influence on the procedures that are decisive for the acceptance or rejection of 
hypotheses.’ But can questions regarding the acceptance of hypotheses be separated from 
questions regarding the application of results (where ethical and other values must be 
granted a legitimate role)? For every hypothesis in empirical science, however well 
confirmed it might be, there remains a certain probability of error. Therefore, whether a 
statement can be considered empirically established and acceptable depends not only on the 
evidence, but also on the standard against which its level of confirmation is measured. The 
sciences of statistics and inductive logic do not allow us to derive which standard is the 
right one to apply (that is which level of inductive risk can be tolerated) in a concrete 
situation. The only way to answer this question in a non-arbitrary manner is in light of the 
potential positive and negative effects that would come about as a result of the acceptance 
and dissemination of a true or false proposition, respectively. In Rudner’s (1953, 6) much-
quoted words, “How sure we need to be before we accept a hypothesis will depend on how 
serious a mistake would be.” In this way, concerns about potential consequences and value 
judgments pertaining to them unfold a relevance for the assessment of validity claims. 
It is one of Douglas’s (2000, 2009) important contributions to these arguments to 
have pointed out that the choices requiring evaluative judgment are not limited to a decision 
of whether or not to accept a hypothesis at the end of an episode of inquiry, but occur at all 
stages throughout the research process. More recently, Justin Biddle and Quill Kukla have 
noted that not all risks of error in epistemic practices can be calibrated in terms of how 
much evidence is sufficient to accept a hypothesis, as the framework of “inductive risk” 
seems to suggest (Biddle, 2016; Biddle & Kukla, 2017). Following them, I will use the 
term “epistemic risks” instead, to acknowledge that not all risks of error are always 
associated with some kind of propositional inference, and also to avoid implying a picture 
where evidence itself is assumed to be risk- and value-free while only evidence-based 
inference is risky and value-laden (on the latter point, see also Brown, 2013). 
The developments outlined above have seriously undermined objectivity as an ideal 
and quality criterion for any type of inquiry. This is obvious for the conception of 
objectivity as value freedom, but it also pertains to other ideas associated with objectivity. 
The notion of objective truth as determined solely by mind-independent facts is not 
immediately affected by any of the criticisms I mentioned, but they do affect the possibility 
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to cash it out as an ideal that is applicable to episodes of inquiry rather than to propositions. 
It is no longer possible to straightforwardly turn the concept of objective truth into one of 
objective inquiry because, as the arguments surrounding epistemic risk and standards of 
confirmation illustrate, inquiry always has to strike a balance between striving for true 
belief and avoiding false belief. Both are indispensable ingredients in the pursuit of 
objective truth, each without the other is utterly pointless. In settling which level of 
epistemic risk to tolerate, we inevitably balance them against each other, and there is no 
neutral or logically correct way of doing so. This is where epistemic interests necessarily 
enter—a point that I will analyze more thoroughly below. For now, I would like to note that 
all this means that if you possess or defend a notion of objective truth, you do not 
automatically also have a conception of objective inquiry at your disposition. Equally, by 
leveling a convincing criticism against the objectivity of inquiry, you have not thereby also 
undermined the notion of objective truth (as the young Habermas might have thought).2 
Metaphysical realism is not the most salient issue with regard to the question of objective 
inquiry.3 
Similar problems beset the strategy of describing objectivity as some kind of 
invariance. While we may try to single out certain propositions as expressing information 
that possesses such invariance, invariance of a process of inquiry seems neither possible 
nor desirable, except under technical transformations in the narrowest sense, such as 
between different units of measurement. In inquiry, a change of perspective or system of 
reference will often imply a different conceptualization of the consequences of getting it 
right and getting it wrong which will—and should—in turn have an effect on our standards 
for acceptable results. Similar considerations apply to the notion of objectivity as 
minimizing the risk of human error. As we have seen, there are always different kinds of 
possible errors. How we distribute our efforts at minimizing them over the different kinds is 
a fact that can typically not be explained or justified without reference to values and 
interests. More specifically, there seems to be no value-free prima facie justification for 
thinking that eliminating human sources of error should always be a priority. 
 
2 In his section on positivism, Habermas assumes that the ubiquity of interests also proves the correspondence 
theory of truth a hopelessly naive idea (1968/1971, p. 69). 
3 Which is not to say that it is no issue at all. If you deny mind-independent reality altogether, as some of the 
more radical constructionist anti-realists sometimes seem to do if you read them literally (e.g. Latour, 2000, p. 
248), then there is not much merit in even starting debates about the objectivity of inquiry, or the 
trustworthiness of expertise. 
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3. Can we dispense with objectivity? 
As a result of all this, there seems to be no acceptable conception of the objectivity of 
inquiry in sight for present day epistemology and philosophy of science. Should we perhaps 
conclude: All the better, we have finally shed the “objectivist illusion”, and good riddance? 
This was supposed to be a liberating moment in the history of thought, but the lacuna that 
an abandonment of objectivity as an epistemological ideal and quality criterion leaves 
behind proves debilitating for epistemology as a critical intellectual enterprise. 
In particular, it would mean that many cases of biased, distorting research could no 
longer be criticized as epistemologically problematic, but only as problematic with regard 
to non-epistemic criteria. Without a substantial ideal of objectivity (as an epistemic ideal) 
researchers could not be criticized for allowing idiosyncratic value influences (such as the 
profit interests of a particular branch of industry) to have an impact on their research, but 
only for permitting the ‘wrong’ kinds of values (i.e., others than those preferred by the 
critic).  
Consider again the observation that there is no value-free way of determining the 
level of epistemic risk that can and should be tolerated when accepting the result of a 
particular line of inquiry. A decision to apply a particularly strict standard for a (positive) 
result will automatically imply a looser standard for negative results or an increased risk for 
the inquiry to end up without any result at all. Typically, each and every methodological 
decision offers an opportunity for trading these different kinds of risks off against each 
other and opens up a whole continuum of different ways in which the balance between 
them could be settled. Must each and every possible distribution of epistemic risks be 
regarded as epistemically equally acceptable? Should differences between them only be 
debatable as differences of opinion with regard to the ethical evaluation of potential 
consequences of error? 
Consider, for example, the choice of animal model in a toxicological trial. Each type 
of laboratory animal has different characteristics that are potentially associated with 
different probabilities of detecting health effects of a given substance of concern. Industry 
scientists might, for example, choose a type of animal that is known for its specific 
robustness and insensitivity with regard to effects caused by the class of substances at issue 
in order to decrease the probability of a positive result.4 If challenged, they might cite 
concerns about false positives and possible over-regulation as a justification of their choice.  
 
4 This hypothetical example is modeled on a concrete episode described in Wilholt (2009). 
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If there was no such thing as objective inquiry, then the only way of criticizing the 
actions of the industry scientists in this scenario would be to take the debate to the level of 
value judgments—for example by demanding that the avoidance of false negatives should 
have a higher priority in toxicological research because of their potentially grave 
consequences for consumers. However, there seem to be instances along the lines of the 
case imagined here where the manipulation of the distribution of epistemic risks can no 
longer be justified with reference to differing opinions about the seriousness of mistakes, 
but where instead the resulting error probabilities amount to a shortcoming, the 
acknowledgment of which does not require one to possess a particular value outlook—
because it is an epistemic rather than a moral failure. It undermines the epistemic 
trustworthiness of the respective episode of inquiry. My aim is to articulate a conception of 
objectivity that will enable us to describe the particular sense in which such examples are 
cases of epistemic shortcoming and that, at the same time, does justice to what is 
convincing about the criticisms of traditional notions of objectivity. 
4. Epistemic trust and the relevance of shared standards and practices 
In undertaking to overcome the impasse that these criticisms have left us with, I take my 
cue from the observation that a problem of unmistakably epistemic character emerges when 
idiosyncrasies of an episode of inquiry undermine its trustworthiness as an information-
providing process.5 The notion of trust invokes the social dimension of inquiry. All 
significant cognitive enterprises probably involve some level of cooperation or at least 
belief based on the testimony of others.6 This is certainly true of the pursuit of knowledge 
in the sciences (Hardwig, 1991). If trust among different actors comes into play, this should 
place some constraints on their individual, value-based choices that impinge on the 
distribution of epistemic risks. Inquirers who know that they gauge epistemic risks 
similarly will be able to invest more trust in each other’s results. For placing at least some 
trust in the results of researchers who are implementing a different value-based assessment 
of tolerable epistemic risks than I do, I will at the very least have to be able to know how 
they distribute epistemic risks. 
 
5 The centrality of the concept of trust for understanding scientific objectivity has been emphasized by Fine 
(1998, pp. 17-19) and Douglas (2009, p. 116). 
6 Coady (1992) forcefully argued for the indispensability of testimony for the justification of even our most 
mundane beliefs. 
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All this may be seen as creating a presumption in favor of shared standards for the 
distribution of epistemic risks, justified in virtue of the necessity of mutual trust.7 However, 
it would be a mistake to view the objectivity of inquiry as defined by the shared stance of a 
community of inquirers. Trying to understand the balance of risks of error, such as it is 
struck by the majority of researchers in their methodological practices and their 
conventional standards, as the solely binding standard and only deviations from it as bias 
and distortion, would mean drawing too simple an image of the interplay between values 
and knowledge communities. This can best be shown using examples of the kind that I will 
call “pervasive distortions”. Under this label, I want to discuss cases in which entire 
communities of researchers, rather than just individuals or factions within a community, 
collectively adjudicate epistemic risk differently than they ought to. 
Examples for pervasive distortions are more difficult to identify and discuss for 
philosophers of science than examples of particular biased studies, because we cannot rely 
on internal disciplinary controversy as an indicator that something is going wrong. The 
clearest examples are perhaps those that we can judge with the benefit of hindsight, such as 
the case of androcentric bias throughout most of the history of the life sciences. To pick a 
more specific aspect of this bias, consider the fact that male-dominated medical sciences 
have over centuries hardly skipped an opportunity to allegedly demonstrate by means of 
physiological facts that women were unsuitable for intellectually demanding tasks: 
Women’s brains were too cold and soft, the female skull too small for a powerful brain, 
intensive use of the brain adversely affected the female reproductive capacity, lack of 
lateralization made the female brain inferior for specific tasks - whenever one hypothesis 
proved scientifically untenable, the next approach stubbornly stepped onto the scene 
(Kourany, 2016, pp. 780-782). 
Suppose for the sake of argument that this history is not grounded in a complete 
disregard for the truth on the part of the researchers. Then, a likely explanation is that it is 
due to a consistently biased management of epistemic risks. Researchers accepted far 
higher risks of false positives with regard to hypotheses concerning the alleged inferiority 
of women than they ought to have done, and thus jumped to conclusions on the slightest 
shred of putative evidence.  
 
7 I myself have used this idea to define a particular type of bias in terms of an infringement of a research 
community’s conventional standards (Wilholt, 2009, 2013, 2016); the suggestion has been taken up by John 
(2015) and Biddle and Leuschner (2015). In what follows, I do not intend to criticize this as a viable approach 
for identifying some problematic kinds of distorting bias, but only to point out that it cannot be 
straightforwardly generalized to yield a useful characterization of objectivity. 
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Note, however, that the normative judgment on what risk the researchers ought to 
have found acceptable in this case cannot be grounded in the implicit or explicit 
conventions of the respective research community. Given the consistent androcentrism of 
medical science throughout much of its history, the problematic epistemic risk management 
may not have even been in conflict with the implicit consensus of the research community 
as it was inscribed in its methodological practices. 
Another example of the phenomenon of pervasive distortion is conservative bias in 
climate science. Several independent analyses of past assessment reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have concluded that, compared to 
observational data, predictions released with the reports have tended to underestimate some 
key parameters of global warming (Rahmstorf, 2007; Committee on Strategic Advice on 
the U.S. Climate Change Science Program, 2009; Allison et al., 2010; Freudenburg & 
Muselli, 2010; Brysse et al., 2013). Notably, this included predictions concerning sea-level 
rise, but also those on CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations, on the melting of 
continental ice-sheets and sea-ice decline. These underestimations of the IPCC reports seem 
to reflect a conservative tendency that is already present in the research literature. It has 
been suggested that this is an effect of the activism and media presence of climate change 
contrarians, whose criticism often takes the form of personal attacks aimed at undermining 
the credibility of climate scientists. As a result of this, climate scientists often find 
themselves in a defensive position. Scientists go out of their way to avoid the impression 
that they ignore criticism, and thus ideas concocted by contrarians from outside the 
discipline (such as that of a purported post-1998 ‘hiatus’ of global mean surface 
temperature rise) have demonstrably seeped into serious scientific discourse 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2015). Apparently, many scientists also take special care to steer 
away from false positives in their predictive conclusions, lest they be branded as 
ideologically biased ‘alarmists’—they prefer “erring on the side of least drama”, as Brynne 
et al. (2013) have put it. From a philosophical point of view, this kind of pervasive 
distortion is interesting because it is not rooted in the climate scientists’ own prejudice. The 
skewed balance of epistemic risks does not reflect the scientists’ own value judgments, but 
rather those of their adversaries. Nonetheless, assuming that the conservative bias is already 
ingrained in the practices of mainstream climate scientists, any lack of objectivity that lies 
therein can obviously not be diagnosed by referring to the standards of the respective 
research community. 
Lest it appear that I am presupposing that pervasive distortion is generally caused by 
the preferences of some actors involved for certain types of research results, I would like to 
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briefly refer to another example. A particular kind of methodological bias has drawn much 
attention lately: In experimental fields (especially those with a high prevalence of 
underpowered studies), incentives and conventions favoring positive results could lead to 
an overrepresentation of positive findings in the published research literature. This has been 
related to the phenomenon of failing replications as it is being discussed under the label 
“replicability crisis” (Romero, 2019). The present social organization of research seems to 
permit and incentivize scientists to exploit their “researcher degrees of freedom” (and, 
arguably, to engage in “questionable research practices”) in ways that are likely to 
contribute to a high false positive rate (Simmons et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Ioannidis et 
al., 2014). It is debatable, for a variety of reasons, whether it is desirable or even possible, 
at least in certain areas of cutting-edge experimental research, to achieve a substantially 
improved reproducibility of results or substantially lower false-positive rates (Bird, in 
press; Feest, 2019). But the mere fact that a large number of researchers agree that 
problems with the reproducibility of results add up to a “crisis” (Baker, 2016) shows that 
the conventions and standards of the respective disciplines do not manage to rule out false 
positives to the extent that scientists themselves expect them to—or used to expect them to, 
prior to becoming aware of the problems. 
When an individual study, by virtue of its methodological choices, tacitly deviates 
from the way in which error risks are routinely managed within the relevant research 
community (as required by explicit standards, or simply because it is consistent and 
unquestioned practice), then this can inherently undermine epistemic trust. However, the 
examples of pervasive distortions discussed in this section all show that this is not the only 
relevant type of threat to trustworthiness and objectivity, and that there are cases in which 
the established standards and practices themselves come under suspicion of being the 
reason for a lack of objectivity. These require an analysis that does not rely on shared 
standards and practices alone as the basis of trustworthiness. I will argue that reviving the 
concept of epistemic interest (in a new, more precise sense) will be of great help in 
approaching such an analysis. 
5. No objectivity without epistemic interest 
When an entire research community shares biased practices and standards, trust among its 
members may continue to work perfectly well, but its results are arguably no longer 
trustworthy from without. This seems to suggest that, over and above following the same 
practices and standards, in order to merit epistemic trust, communities in some sense need 
to follow the right ones. How might the relevant sense of rightness be grounded? 
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From a traditional perspective, it might seem attractive to try and provide an answer 
to this question by grounding the objectivity of an episode of inquiry in the notion of 
objective truth: The right standards and practices are conducive to the attainment of (mind-
independent, invariant, value-free) truth. However, the cases we just discussed may serve 
again to illustrate the problem with this approach that we identified in section 2.  
To introduce a bit of convenient jargon, gleaned from the terminology of medical 
testing, let us call the reliability of positive results (i.e., the probability that a positive result 
is true) within a particular study or research methodology its specificity. Correspondingly, 
let us use sensitivity for the reliability of negative results within a given research 
methodology. It is important to note that these two central dimensions do not yet 
completely describe the degrees of freedom of epistemic risk management. A third 
dimension along which different projects of inquiry into the same question can vary is their 
productivity—the rate at which they produce results of any kind at all, irrespective of their 
positive or negative character, over a certain time span. 
To emphasize the importance of the productivity dimension (often overlooked in 
discussions about epistemic risks), take the example of experimental psychology, one of the 
fields of concern in the replicability crisis. To claim that published results in this field 
contain too many false positives is to claim that experimental research in psychology is (or 
has been) lacking in specificity. However, this does not imply that low specificity must 
have been accepted in exchange for high sensitivity. In fact, an analysis of published non-
significant results in psychology has indicated that many of them may be false negatives 
(Hartgerink et al., 2017). There is at present no reason to believe that experimental research 
in psychology is displaying a high degree of sensitivity. Instead, it seems that both 
specificity and sensitivity have been traded off for an increased productivity of 
psychological research. 
Would this mean that psychological research is insufficiently geared towards the 
truth? No, because productivity is a dimension of the search for truth just as sensitivity and 
specificity are. It is almost trivial to achieve high sensitivity and specificity if you are 
prepared to sacrifice productivity—for example by adopting a research strategy that only 
deals with obvious cases and suspends judgment on all the rest. Aiming for the truth 
implies aiming at reliable results, but it also implies aiming at results. A research program 
that would place no value at all on productivity could not convincingly claim to be 
concerned with the pursuit of truth. However, the fact that many psychologists themselves 
are alarmed about the reported replicability problems indicates that existing practices have 
been overemphasizing productivity at the cost of specificity and sensitivity in a way that 
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crosses a line. It is not a lack of truth-directedness that seems to be a problem, but a 
somehow inadequate balance between the different dimensions of pursuing the truth.  
Similarly, diagnosing conservative bias in present-day climate science does not imply 
a charge that researchers are not fully committed to truth-conducive inquiry. It merely 
means that existing practices place an exaggerated priority on specificity—this time to the 
considerable detriment of sensitivity. 
Some of the 20th century criticisms of objectivity came to the conclusion that truth is 
too strong a notion; that defining the aims of science in terms of truth would mean to make 
them unattainable by definition. The above considerations show that the opposite is the 
case. Truth alone is too weak a notion for holding a substantial and helpful conception of 
the objectivity of inquiry together. 
It is for this reason that redefinition of the concept of epistemic interest is needed. 
The definition must explicitly refer to the orientation of inquiry towards truth but at the 
same time emphasize that within the confines of this orientation, different specific kinds of 
directedness exist. Each such kind of directedness represents a specific epistemic interest. 
An epistemic interest in this sense is a set of objectives characterizing the exact manner in 
which a given activity is directed at finding the truth. More precisely, this set of objectives 
must include: a question (or set of questions) that the investigation is devoted to finding the 
true answer to, a target specificity, a target sensitivity, and a target productivity.  
For some contexts, it might be useful to individuate epistemic interests further, as 
there is another dimension to the pursuit of truth that is not yet reflected in the above set of 
objectives. When science pursues a question, finding a full, maximally informative answer 
is often not possible (at least within predictable time frames). Instead, research typically 
delivers (and strives to deliver) partial answers. Partial answers to the same question may 
differ along several dimensions such as comprehensiveness and precision. For illustration, 
consider the following answers to the question “Where in the world does Rhinoceros 
sondaicus live in the wild?”—“In Asia.” “Only in Indonesia.” “Some can be found on the 
island of Java.” “All remaining individuals live on the westernmost tip of Java, in Ujung 
Kulon National Park.” Epistemic interests in the same question and aiming for the same 
specificity, sensitivity, and productivity may still differ in the precision and 
comprehensiveness of the partial answers that they strive for. For the remainder of this 
paper, I will nevertheless abstract from this aspect and treat epistemic interests as 
individuated on the basis of question pursued, target specificity, target sensitivity and target 
productivity.  
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Restricting the characteristics that individuate epistemic interests to such traits as can 
be understood as dimensions of the search for truth is intended to accomplish nothing more 
than to do justice to the truism that “in pursuing the answer to a question, we are 
automatically pursuing the truth on that question” (Sosa, 2003, p. 157). In particular, this 
restriction does not amount to a commitment to the claim that truth is ‘the aim of science’.8 
In particular, it in no way entails that if p is an unknown truth, some scientist (or ‘science’) 
must develop an epistemic interest concerning p. In effect, the restriction stipulates that if 
any cognitive subject pursues an interest that concerns a particular question, it only counts 
as an epistemic interest if certain minimal evaluative attitudes are reflected in the actions 
that constitute its pursuit—specifically, preferences (however slight) for getting true results 
over getting no results and for getting no results over getting false results.9  
For such preferences to be meaningful at all, the truth or falsity of the outcome of an 
investigation must be considered constituted by something that is independent of the course 
of the investigation itself and its outcome. In this sense, the conception of epistemic 
interests proposed here presupposes alethic realism. However, it is by no means committed 
to scientific realism, but is fully compatible, for example, with anti-realist positions such as 
constructive empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980). The latter would merely amount to a 
restriction on the epistemic interests pursued in the sciences, confining them in the first 
dimension (the set of questions pursued) to questions about observable objects.10 
On the basis of this revised notion of epistemic interest, we can now make a new 
attempt at understanding objectivity as a property of episodes of inquiry—namely, as a 
form of match between the method of investigation and the relevant epistemic interest. A 
good match in this respect is what underlies the trustworthiness of science as an epistemic 
enterprise. This would mean that the ubiquity and diversity of epistemic interests is not 
 
8 For some deserved criticism of talk about the ‘aim of science’, see Rowbottom, 2014. 
9 More precisely, a minimal commitment to truth requires preferring, in any world in which p holds, that the 
inquiry come to the result p over an inquiry with no result, and in turn preferring that over the result not-p, 
and conversely, in any world in which not-p holds, preferring an inquiry with result not-p over an inquiry with 
no result, and preferring that over the result p. No particular kinds of preferences between the worlds realizing 
p and non-p are required, because these have no meaning for methodological decisions (insofar as these are 
rationally made in the light of preferences). For a Bayesian model that justifies this last point and shows that 
the weak preferences mentioned above are sufficient for methodological decisions made in their light to be 
expected to lead to an investigation with non-vanishing specificity and sensitivity, see Wilholt (2013). 
10 Since van Fraassen (1980, pp. 12-13, cf. p. 82) also acknowledges a pragmatic dimension of theory 
acceptance, meaning that scientists who accept a theory use its full conceptual repertoire (not only what it 
says about observables) to confront future phenomena, seek explanations, and so on, constructive empiricists 
adopting the language of epistemic interests might say that scientists also in some sense ‘pursue’ questions 
about unobservable things, but that this form of pursuit need not constitute genuine epistemic interests (and 
will not amount to it for scientists who are appropriately modest about the achievable epistemic objectives of 
science). 
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undermining the very possibility of scientific objectivity as critical theory once suspected. 
Rightly understood, objectivity is a relation of appropriateness between a collective effort 
of inquiry and its underlying epistemic interest.  
But what is the ‘relevant’ or ‘underlying’ epistemic interest that scientific research 
needs to reflect in order to count as objective? A straightforward way to answer this 
question would be to stipulate that researchers ought to adjust their methodologies to the 
epistemic interests prevailing in society.11 However, this might easily lead to counter-
intuitive consequences. While there is good reason to demand that researchers take the 
public’s views on risks and potential benefits into account, they should not just emulate the 
public’s views. Consider the example of a 2007 survey which showed that the public is 
considerably less concerned about the potential new health risks arising from research on 
nano-materials than the scientists involved in the pertinent research (Scheufele et al., 2007). 
It would not be a convincing proposal to suggest that researchers studying potential health 
risks of nano-materials ought to lower their sensitivity targets in accordance with the more 
relaxed attitudes of the public. 
Instead of requiring that researchers ought to adjust their methodology to prevailing 
interests, one thing that can and must be expected of them is to ceteris paribus conform to 
the epistemic interests that are characteristic for the kind of inquiry that they are publicly 
perceived to be engaged in. An episode of research is objective exactly to the extent that it 
is effectively designed in every detail and in every respect to serve precisely these 
epistemic interests. This is a standard against which individual research teams as well as 
entire research communities (together with their own methodological conventions) can be 
measured. 
Conservative bias in climate science is a phenomenon of concern because the 
epistemic interest that climate science is perceived to be serving would demand that it 
avoids a systematic underestimation of effects. It is not that there is not some epistemic 
interest that could be served by an undertaking that gives all the priority to avoiding false 
positives at the risk of systematically underestimating future developments of global 
warming – but that is not the epistemic interest that almost everybody, including climate 
scientists themselves, associate with the collective enterprise of climate science. 
Objectivity is a normative concept. The normative force of objectivity, understood 
along the lines that I am suggesting, can be explained with reference to the indispensability 
 
11 In a similar spirit, John (2019) has demanded that the justification of published findings be compatible with 
the values of the putative audience, and Intemann (2015) suggests that influence of non-epistemic values on 
research is legitimate if it promotes “democratically endorsed” aims. 
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of epistemic trust. It is not the case that objectivity in this sense guarantees that everyone 
can trust the results of objective research without reservation. After all, the epistemic 
interests of the individual may well diverge from the epistemic interests that the respective 
research is serving according to public perception. But objective inquiry in this sense 
enables users of information to reliably assess the degree to which results can be expected 
to fit their own epistemic interests. 
The epistemic interest that an episode of inquiry is ‘perceived to be serving’ is clearly 
a more or less vague concept. That is not to say that it may not even be quite precisely 
defined for some cases, especially when the type of inquiry is highly formalized, when it 
has been well established as a source of public information for an extended period of time 
or has an extended and transparent track record. But for some cases the perceived epistemic 
purpose of a branch of scientific research may be so vague as to correspond to a rather wide 
scattering of possible epistemic interests. (Note that even if the perceived epistemic interest 
is really a rather wide scattering of epistemic interests, it does not mean that there are not 
epistemic interests that are definitely and recognizably not included. Vagueness does not 
make a concept useless; cf. van Fraassen, 1980, p. 16.) The concept of objectivity thus 
inherits this vagueness by way of the definition that I propose. I think this is how it ought to 
be, as objectivity is in fact more difficult to assess when the exact epistemic purposes of an 
investigation are shrouded in imprecision. In extreme cases, it may become impossible to 
achieve.  
In a similar vein, the public may be so deeply divided with regard to what they 
perceive as the epistemic interest that a given investigation is serving that one cannot 
reconstruct a shared conception, however vague, of its perceived epistemic interest. I 
believe this kind of disagreement is less common than conflict over the epistemic interest 
that scientific research ought to be serving, which is a different matter and does not affect 
my definition. But it is certainly possible, and in that case, too, objectivity becomes 
unattainable. Again, I think this is appropriate: In whichever way one defines objectivity, 
there will always be conceivable constellations of deep disagreement under which 
meaningful exchange about the objectivity of inquiry breaks down. 
Both observations entail a normative corollary: To achieve objectivity, epistemic 
interests should ideally be transparently communicated. For this purpose, the researchers 
themselves must first make a conscious determination of their epistemic interests. This is 
related to another normative ramification: Objectivity requires that the design and course of 
the investigation is guided by the epistemic interests—and not vice versa. Confusing this 
order and adapting the ostensibly pursued epistemic interests in the light of obstacles or 
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unforeseen events of the research process is a source of many typical questionable research 
practices. 
6. Objections and rejoinders 
Objection: An episode of inquiry that follows one particular epistemic interest represents 
only one perspective. An adequate definition of objectivity must require multiple points of 
view; it is better to define objectivity as pluralism of approaches and value influences. 
Especially Helen Longino (1990, 2002) has pioneered a strategy in which the concept of 
objectivity is in effect abandoned at the level of individual researchers and then regained at 
the level of research communities—in the form of an ideal of diversity and plurality. A first 
rejoinder to this objection is to point out that the pluralist strategy of defining objectivity 
does not address the challenge that I have outlined in section 3. A conception of objectivity 
that resides on the level of the community is ineffective when it comes to the goal of 
finding a basis on which individual scientists or groups can be criticized on epistemological 
grounds, e.g., for deliberately choosing a research design or a publication strategy that 
strongly favors positive results over negative ones. 
A second reply is independent of the particular philosophical goals that I have 
prioritized in this paper: While science thrives on controversy, scientific communities do 
not, as a general rule, remain divided with respect to important questions of their disciplines 
over indefinite periods of time. At least sometimes they converge on a consensus. What do 
we make of this in the context of the pluralist framework? If objectivity-as-pluralism is an 
ideal, why ever strive for consensus? (Cf. Carrier, 2013.) Does settling a dispute go against 
the ideal of objective inquiry? This question may seem lame, but it is very difficult to 
answer if objectivity is defined in terms of pluralism. The difficulty suggests that pluralism 
does not work as a definition of objectivity. More precisely: While the pluralist ideal may 
correctly identify important instrumental preconditions for scientific objectivity, it fails to 
give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objectivity, as a desirable characteristic 
of research processes, consists of. To see this more clearly, we may pose the question: Why 
is objectivity a desirable characteristic of a collective epistemic enterprise? If objectivity is 
defined as pluralism, the best answer might be: in order to facilitate mutual criticism. But 
why do we want mutual criticism? Pluralism and mutual criticism are clearly features of the 
scientific enterprise that are not desired for their own sake, but because they facilitate 
something. Only if and when we can say what that something is have we found the 
substantial notion of objectivity that we are looking for. 
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Objection: Why so complicated? Science can secure the trustworthiness of its results 
by following strict standards. Strict standards make sure that individuals have good reason 
to trust, no matter what their personal epistemic interests are. Both Carrier (2010) and John 
(2015) have argued along these lines, where strict standards are understood to mean a 
painstaking avoidance of false positives—in the terminology used earlier: a high 
specificity. Both Carrier and John work from the idea that a high degree of specificity 
guarantees that results of the research will be trustworthy for users who, in my terminology, 
share epistemic interests with lower specificity targets. High standards would then be 
downward compatible, in a manner of speaking. 
The central limitation of this argument is that it only holds for positive results. For 
negative results, it is sensitivity rather than specificity that matters for compatibility. Also, 
the argument overlooks that users have productivity targets in addition to their specificity 
and sensitivity targets. In other words, they may be in urgent need for information, a need 
that is badly served by deferring judgment until an extremely high degree of specificity can 
be guaranteed. And given that science never operates with unlimited resources, higher 
specificity means either lower sensitivity or lower productivity, or both. The case of 
conservative bias in climate science illustrates the point. Arguably, conservative bias means 
that specificity targets are excessive, meaning that much needed information is not made 
available, or is made available too late. This makes the totality of the output of scientific 
research on this subject less trustworthy for an audience with higher productivity targets, 
and can potentially negatively affect their actual trust. 
Stipulating that high specificity best serves the interests of science is not an interest-
free proviso by which science stays on the safe side. It is itself the expression of a particular 
kind of epistemic interest. In methodology, there is no such thing as the safe side. 
Another good case in point are the many problems that have been identified with the 
methodological ideals of evidence-based medicine (EBM). One way to pinpoint a core 
deficiency in its hierarchical methodology that places large randomized controlled trials at 
the top is that it gives almost all the priority to specificity, much less to sensitivity, and 
none at all to productivity. Doctors and patients alike do need reliable positive results from 
medical research, and EBM places a high premium on this need. But the need for reliable 
results needs to be balanced against the need for results. In this regard, EBM may fail the 
prevailing epistemic interests of the public in many cases (Worrall, 2002; Goldenberg, 
2006; Borgerson, 2009). 
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Objection: When epistemic interests are individuated by objectives that are 
characterized as ‘dimensions of the search for truth’, then what are the references to 
critical theory good for? This has nothing to do with epistemic interests in their sense 
anymore. From my point of view, the proposed account is, on the contrary, also an attempt 
to revive certain core Habermasian ideas: For every kind of inquiry, there is an underlying 
epistemic interest that is constitutive for the knowledge-generating process. It is wrong to 
conceive of these interests as distorting or interfering with an imaginary ideal of inquiry. 
There is no coherent and non-arbitrary conception of inquiry that does without epistemic 
interests (cf. Habermas, 1968/1971, p. 210). 
Admittedly, there are also striking differences: Habermas meant to identify three 
types of inquiry and correlate them with three epistemic interests (“empirical-analytical” 
inquiry corresponds to “technical” interest, “historical-hermeneutical” inquiry to “practical” 
interest and “critically oriented” inquiry to “emancipatory” interest). In contrast, my 
proposed redefinition implies a multi-dimensional continuum of epistemic interests. 
Perhaps more crucially, Habermas (1968/1971, pp. 69, 307) also thought that the notion of 
objective truth was thereby discredited. He thought that the idea of an ideal of inquiry that 
is free of values and interests is a straightforward consequence of a realist notion of truth, 
and that the latter must therefore be abandoned with the former. But since the claimed 
entailment does not hold, the path is open for a truth-based conception of epistemic 
interests. 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that, properly understood, objectivity designates the proper relation of an 
episode of inquiry not to an object, but to an objective (or set of objectives). To my mind, 
this is more than just a pun, or a piece of revisionist etymology. What is important is that 
the proposed definition captures the insight that objectivity is a kind of fit—one that has so 
far tended to be overlooked. The recent philosophical debate about values in science has 
largely been framed as one about how the ways in which value judgments involved in 
research are often non-transparent and difficult to account for. This makes it easy to 
overlook that even if we were able to precisely account for all the value influences and 
precisely assess the epistemic risks involved, results would still be value-laden—and 
therefore, depending on the epistemic interest that the research in question is supposed to 
be serving, more or less useful and trustworthy. Knowing exactly how an episode of 
research deviates from an intended epistemic interest is crucial for calibrating the 
appropriate level of trust, but it does not make it more capable of serving that particular 
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epistemic interest (or of justifying a high level of trust from people who share it). For that, 
what is ideal is as close a match as possible.  
I have proposed a relativized notion of objectivity—but it is appropriately relativized. 
Some might balk at a notion of scientific objectivity that makes it relative to epistemic 
interest. But note that an epistemic interest is not just any kind of interest. It is a set of 
objectives that all represent dimensions of the search for truth. All this is compatible with, 
in fact premised on, a realist conception of truth. There is no danger that the definition will 
make talk about objectivity arbitrary or unduly permissive. 
It is also a conception of objectivity that takes episodes of inquiry as the proper 
category to which the notion is first and foremost applied. Finally, a good match between 
methodology and publicly identifiable epistemic interest underlies the trustworthiness of 
science as an epistemic enterprise, whereas a lack of such a match undermines trust by 
making the calibration of appropriate levels of trust impossible. The proposed notion thus 
captures the intimate relation between objectivity and trustworthiness. 
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